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STATEMENT <j£ .^JURISDICTION 
•J i i i sdi ciiori is conferred e^ ^is Court by Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-J (1996) (2)(e) (appeals from a court of record in 
criminal cases, except those involving a conviction of a first 
degree or capital felony) Appellant appeal 
judgmen^ in ssa 1 w i I seconc '- :; - : 
- q- iving Under the Influence of Alcohol, Driving on a 
Suspended License, and Faulty Equipment and the latent filing of 
an appeal from the Appellant's original «voluntary dismissal. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Whether the tri al court abused its discretion to 
dismiss with prejudice in light of prosecutorial misconduct? 
(2) Whether the trial court should have awarded 
attorney fees and costs to Defendant? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
(1) - (2) The trial court did not abuse its discretion 
to dismiss this matter "with prejudice." 
In Maxfield l"v. Fishier, 538 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1975)], the 
Utah Supreme court affirmed a trial court's dismissal with 
prejudice against the plaintiff for "inexcusable neglect in 
failing to prepare and prosecute her claim with reasonable 
diligence." Id. at 1324-25. In the instant case, the trial 
court provided plaintiffs "an opportunity to be heard and to 
do justice." Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen 
Contractor, Inc., 544 P.2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975). Plaintiffs 
nevertheless abused their opportunity through dilatory 
conduct. 
We therefore find no abuse of discretion and affirm the 
trial court's order denying plaintiffs1 motion to set aside 
the dismissal. Costs to defendants. 
Charlie Brown Constr. Co., Inc. v. Leisure Sports, Inc, 740 P.2d 
1368, 1371 (Utah App. 1987). 
(2) The trial court should have awarded attorney fees 
and costs to the Appellee. 
The choice of an appropriate discovery sanction is primarily 
the responsibility of the trial judge and will not be 
reversed absent an abuse of discretion. 
First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Schamanek, 684 P.2d 1257, 
1266 (Utah 1984) (citations omitted); see also Arnica Mut. 
Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 961 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). "Because trial courts must deal first hand with the 
parties and the discovery process, they are given broad 
discretion regarding the imposition of discovery sanctions." 
Darrinqton v. Wade, 812 P.2d 452, 457 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); 
see also Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 790 P.2d 584, 
585 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (1990); 8A 
Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 2291 (1994) (discussing the federal rule). 
Utah D.O.T. v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4 (Utah 1995). 
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STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah R. Civ. P. 11 Utah R. Crim. P. 25 
Utah R. Crim P. 16 Utah R. Civ. P. 81 
Utah R. Civ. P. 41 Utah Const, art. I, § 12 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of the Case: 
This case arises from the second dismissal "with 
prejudice" of charges filed against Mr. Burningham after the 
first information was voluntarily dismissed on motion by the 
State. Said Motion was filed in light of the State's failure to 
provide a video tape by way of discovery and court order to 
provide the tape in five days. 
II. Course of the Proceedings: 
This case went through two trial courts without a 
trial. This matter was first filed in the Third Circuit Court of 
Salt Lake County, Salt Lake Department and the matter was 
assigned to the Honorable Phillip K. Palmer under case no. 
955017625TC. (R. at 1-3). The State voluntarily motioned for a 
dismissal and the Court granted same based on the premise that 
the State was unable to provide the defense, within five days, 
the video tape as ordered by Judge Palmer. (R. at 114-16). 
Then the State refiled, (r. at 4-6), in the Third 
Circuit Court of Salt Lake County, Salt Lake Department and 
assigned to the Honorable Leon A. Dever under case no. 
955039908TC. Judge Dever dismissed this matter by interpreting 
the prior dismissal as "with prejudice" in light of the fact that 
the State's motion to dismiss was after the expiration of the 
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five day limitation to provide the video tape to the defense. 
(R. at 69-73). 
III. Disposition in Trial Court: 
Judge Dever ordered this matter dismissed with 
prejudice and denied Mr. Burningham!s request for attorney fees. 
IV. Statement of Facts; 
Charges were filed under case no. 955017625TC against 
Mr. Burningham on May 30, 1995. (R. at 1-3). The Honorable 
Phillip K. Palmer was assigned to the case. Mr. Burningham 
requested discovery and the State responded. On September 29, 
1995 the trial court held a pre-trial conference. At the pre-
trial, the defense indicated that Mr. Burninghara was not provided 
a copy of the video tape identified by the prosecution when the 
State responded to the discovery request. Judge Palmer granted 
the defense a continuance in order for the State to provide the 
defense with the video tape. At the next pre-trial conference on 
October 23, 1995, the State still did not provide the defense 
with the video tape and Judge Palmer ordered the State to provide 
the tape within five days. Instead of providing the video tape 
by October 28, 1995, the State voluntarily motioned for a 
dismissal on October 30, 1995. The State motioned to dismiss 
this matter on the basis the State was unable to provide the 
defense with the video tape as ordered by Judge Palmer. (R. at 
114-16). On the same date, the trial court granted the order of 
dismissal. 
Then, the State refiled the charges against Mr. 
Burningham, (r. at 4-6), and issued another warrant for his 
arrest, (R. at 7), on November 29, 1995. Additionally, a notice 
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of (second) arraignment was mailed to Mr. Burningham on December 
4, 1995 notifying Mr. Burningham of an arraignment on December 
28, 1995. (R. at 8). After Mr. Burningham pled Not Guilty— 
again, he rehired D. Bruce Oliver to represent him and Mr. Oliver 
re-entered his appearance and re-requested discovery on February 
22, 1996. (R. at 12-19). On March 5, 1996, the State responded 
to discovery, minus the video tape again. (R. at 21-22). 
However, the State supplemented its discovery and finally 
provided the September 1995 requested and October 23, 1995 
ordered tape on April 3, 1996. (R. at 23-24). 
Based on the foregoing prosecutorial failure and facts, 
on August 2, 1996, Judge Dever dismissed this matter interpreting 
the prior dismissal as "with prejudice" in light of the fact that 
the State!s motion to dismiss was after the expiration of the 
five day limitation to provide the video tape to the defense. 
(R. at 69-73). Contemporaneously, Judge Dever denied Mr. 
Burningham1s request for costs. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial judges in this matter abused no discretion by 
dismissing either cases. Judge Palmer appropriately granted this 
case upon motion by the State for failing to comply with the 
court's order to comply with the discovery. 
Likewise, Judge Dever appropriately interpreted Judge 
Palmer's dismissal as "with prejudice." However, Judge Dever 
should have based the his conclusions based on the findings that 
the Statefs motion to dismiss was voluntary, and by applying Rule 
41, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure pursuant to Rule 81(e), Utah 
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Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, an order of attorney fees 
would have been appropriate. 
ARGUMENT 
Preface. 
As the Utah State Supreme Court has stated: 
In Utah, the supreme court has, in addition to common 
law power, constitutional authority to manage the 
appellate process, Utah Const, art. V, § 1, art. VIII, 
§§ 1, 4, as well as inherent supervisory authority over 
all courts of this State. E.g., State v. Brown, 201 
Utah Adv. Rep. 4, 7 (Nov. 30, 1992); State v. Gardner, 
789 P.2d 273, 290 (Utah 1989) (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring), cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1090 (1990); State 
v. Florez, 777 P.2d 452, 458 (Utah 1989); State v. 
James, 767 P.2d 549, 557 (Utah 1989); In re Criminal 
Investigation, 754 P.2d 633, 653 (Utah 1988); State v. 
Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 499 (Utah 1988) (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring in the result); In re Clatterbuck, 700 P.2d 
1076, 1081 (Utah 1985). Unless constrained by a 
constitutional or statutory provision, we exercise our 
powers to fashion standards of review that we think 
best allocate responsibility between appellate and 
trial courts in light of the particular determination 
under review. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that 
the allocation of responsibility, or discretion, 
between trial and appellate courts is a matter of 
peculiar and close importance to the courts in 
question, and we see no reason why our authority to 
define standards of review should not extend to cases 
where the determination under review is a question of 
federal law. 
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993). The Thurman Court 
went on to explain, in pertinent part: 
It is widely agreed that the primary function of a 
standard of review is to apportion power and, 
consequently, responsibility between trial and 
appellate courts for determining an issue or class of 
issues. See, e.g., State v. Sykes, 198 Utah Adv. Rep. 
35, 38 (Ct. App. Oct. 19, 1992) (Jackson, J., 
concurring); Davis v. United States, 564 A.2d 31, 36 
(D.C. 1989); Paul D. Carrington et al., Justice on 
Appeal 130 (1976); Patrick W. Brennan, Standards of 
Appellate Review, 33 Def. L.J. 377, 377 (1984); Ronald 
R. Hofer, Standards of Review — Looking Beyond the 
Labels, 74 Marq. L. Rev. 231, 232 (1991) [hereinafter 
Hofer]; Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 
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85 Colum. L. Rev. 229, 234-35 (1985) [hereinafter 
Monaghan]. Put another way, a standard of review 
allocates discretion between trial and appellate 
courts. In determining the appropriateness of a 
particular allocation of responsibility for deciding an 
issue or class of issues, account should be taken of 
the relative capabilities of each level of the court 
system to take evidence and make findings of fact in 
the face of conflicting evidence, on the one hand, and 
to set binding jurisdiction-wide policy, on the other. 
See, e.g., Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114-15 
(1985); United States v. Ortiz, 878 F.2d 125, 126-27 
(3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Daughtrey, 874 F.2d 
213, 217-18 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. McConney, 
728 F.2d 1195, 1201-02 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert, 
denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984); Davis, 564 A.2d at 36-37. 
In short, the choice of the appropriate standard of 
review "turns on a determination that, as a matter of 
the sound administration of justice, one judicial actor 
is better positioned than another to decide the issue 
in question." Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 
559-60 (1988) (quoting Miller, 474 U.S. at 114); accord 
Salve Regina College v. Russell, 111 S. Ct. 1217, 1222 
(1991). See generally Hofer at 237-41. 
Id. In other words, the Utah Supreme Court absent an expressed 
Federal Law limiting the Court's power is free to govern itself 
and rule of Utah matters free and clear of out-of-state 
influences. 
POINT I. 
THE "DISMISSAL-WITH-PREJUDICE" 
WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
The State argues in its Point I of Appellants Brief 
that the dismissal in this case should be construed as a 
dismissal without prejudice. As a basis, the State relies on 
Salt Lake City v. Dorman-Leigh, 912 P.2d 452 (Utah App. 1996). 
Dorman-Leigh is clearly distinguishable from the case at issue in 
this matter. The State fails to inform this Court of the pre-
trial conference held on September 29, 1995 which was continued 
at the request of the Defendant so that the Defendant could view 
the "video tape"* (see docket entry Appendix "C" of Appellant's 
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Brief entry date of 09/29/95). The pre-trial conference was 
continued until October 23, 1995- (R. at 112). On October 23, 
1995 at the pre-trial conference it was reported to the Court 
that the video tape had not yet been made available to the 
defense. Judge Palmer then gave the State five more days in 
which to produce the tape for the defense (see docket entry 
Appendix "C" of Appellants Brief entry date of 10/23/95). In 
the same minute entry of October 23, 1995 the Court advises the 
State that failure to produce the tape within said five days, the 
case would be dismissed. Id. Because the State was not going to 
produce the tape within the specified five days the State filed a 
preemptive "Motion to Dismiss", the sole purpose of which was to 
outsmart the Judge and the system. The State now complains about 
the results of its own misdeeds. 
In the first instance the State argues that the 
Defendant did not attempt to mitigate his damages. THIS IS 
CLEARLY INTENDED TO MISLEAD THIS COURT, The Defendant's conduct 
is not up on appeal. The State1s attempt to misguide this Court 
is comparable to the same attempt to outsmart the system below in 
the trial court. The Defendant did indeed attempt to mitigate 
his damages below. The Defendant requested a continuance in the 
trial Court for the sole purpose of obtaining said discovery. (R. 
at 112). At the subsequent hearing the State was given a second 
continuance to produce the tape. Then prior to its deadline the 
State "blinked!"—it threw in the towel and moved the Court for a 
dismissal of the action so as to avoid trouble. (R. at 114-16.) 
Once the prior matter was ordered dismissed, the State refiled 
the action against Mr. Burningham. Based thereupon, Mr. 
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Burningham moved the trial court to dismiss this action—the 
second action, which Judge Dever, correctly, granted. 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 25 (hereinafter 
"Rule 25") is NOT applicable in this case. Rule 25 provides: 
Rule 25. Dismissal without trial. 
(a) In its discretion, for substantial cause and in 
furtherance of justice, the court may, either on its own 
initiative or upon application of either party, order an 
information or indictment dismissed. 
(b) The court shall dismiss the information or indictment 
when: 
(1) There is unreasonable or unconstitutional delay in 
bringing defendant to trial; 
(2) The allegations of the information or indictment, 
together with any bill of particulars furnished in support 
thereof, do not constitute the offense intended to be 
charged in the pleading so filed; 
(3) It appears that there was a substantial and 
prejudicial defect in the impaneling or in the proceedings 
relating to the grand jury; 
(4) The court is without jurisdiction; or 
(5) The prosecution is barred by the statute of 
limitations. 
(c) The reasons for any such dismissal shall be set forth 
in an order and entered in the minutes. 
(d) If the dismissal is based upon the grounds that there 
was unreasonable delay, or the court is without 
jurisdiction, or the offense was not properly alleged in the 
information or indictment, or there was a defect in the 
impaneling or of the proceedings relating to the grand jury, 
further prosecution for the offense shall not be barred and 
the court may make such orders with respect to the custody 
of the defendant pending the filing of new charges as the 
interest of justice may require. Otherwise the defendant 
shall be discharged and bail exonerated. An order of 
dismissal based upon unconstitutional delay in bringing the 
defendant to trial or based upon the statute of limitations, 
shall be a bar to any other prosecution for the offense 
charged. 
(e) In misdemeanor cases, upon motion of the prosecutor, 
the court may dismiss the case if it is compromised by the 
defendant and the injured party. The injured party shall 
first acknowledge the compromise before the court or in 
writing. The reasons for the order shall be set forth 
therein and entered in the minutes. The order shall be a bar 
to another prosecution for the same offense; provided 
however, that dismissal by compromise shall not be granted 
when the misdemeanor is committed by or upon a peace officer 
while in the performance of his duties, or riotously, or 
with an intent to commit a felony. 
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Id, This rule does not apply to this case. The State 
erroneously attempts to hide behind this provision. This Rule 25 
sets out the specific provisions to which it is applicable. The 
State sought and filed its own Motion to Dismiss, (R. at 114), 
and now attempts to hide behind Rule 25 to justify it's erroneous 
refiling of this action. The case before Judge Palmer was not 
dismissed pursuant to Rule 25 it was dismissed pursuant to Rule 
16(g), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (hereinafter "Rule 16"), 
which states: 
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it 
is brought to the attention of the court that a party has 
failed to comply with this rule, the court may order such 
party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a 
continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence 
not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems 
just under the circumstances. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 16. 
In this case, the trial court previously elected to 
allow the inspection of the tape (the granting of the defendant's 
request for a continuance on September 25, 1995). (R. at 112). 
The trial court then gave the prosecution a second chance. When 
the prosecution was not going to comply therewith, the State 
executed a preemptive strike to take the sting out of the trial 
court's order. (R. at 114). Rule 16(g) allows the Court the 
discretion to fashion remedies appropriate to the circumstances 
and to each individual case. The rule provides, "or it may 
enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances." 
This case then is a case involving the discretion of 
the trial court judge as provided in Rule 16(g) and not Rule 25. 
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To allow the State to circumvent the sanctions intended by the 
Court pursuant to a violation of Rule 16(g) would be to allow the 
State to ignore the trial courtfs authority- JUST DO A VOLUNTARY 
DISMISSAL AFTER THE COURT ANNOUNCES IT'S INTENDED SANCTIONS THEN 
REFILE AND YOU TAKE THE AUTHORITY AWAY FROM THE COURT! 
This theory as espoused by the State flies in the face 
of many of the well accepted legal theories, viz., res judicata, 
judicial economy, forum shopping, judicial economy and finality 
of judicial orders. This Court should not condone preemptive 
dismissals by a party with the intent of avoiding a trial court's 
order and authority including sanctions. Both Judge Dever and 
Judge Palmer made correct decisions, well within their 
discretion, and as such should be affirmed and the States appeal 
should be dismissed. 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE AWARDED 
THE DEFENDANT HIS ATTORNEYS FEES. 
The State wants its cake and wants to eat it too. It 
didnft want the case dismissed before Judge Palmer; it wanted to 
refile the case because it screwed up. It wants this matter to 
be controlled by Rule 25. The State wanted to beat the judge by 
filing a voluntary dismissal before the imposition of Judge 
Palmer's sanctions. It wants to ignore Rule 16(g). It believes 
that the only sanction available to which Mr. Burningham is to 
keep the tape from being used at the time of trial. It wants 
this Court to believe that the Defendant has not been prejudiced. 
It does not claim any prejudice to itself. 
The State's motion to dismiss was not by way of stipulation. 
11 
This was an action which was taken by the State, on it's own. 
Truly, the controlling provisions are not in the Rules 
of Criminal Procedure, but rather the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 81(e) (hereinafter "Rule 
81(e)") provides, as follows: 
Rule 81. Applicability of rules in general. 
(a) Special statutory proceedings. These rules 
shall apply to all special statutory proceedings, 
except insofar as such rules are by their nature 
clearly inapplicable. Where a statute provides for 
procedure by reference to any part of the former 
Code of Civil Procedure, such procedure shall be 
in accordance with these rules. 
(b) Probate and guardianship. These rules shall 
not apply to proceedings in uncontested probate 
and guardianship matters, but shall apply to all 
proceedings subsequent to the joinder of issue 
therein, including the enforcement of any judgment 
or order entered. 
(c) Procedure in city courts and justice courts. 
These rules shall apply to civil actions commenced 
in the city or justice courts, except insofar as 
such rules are by their nature clearly 
inapplicable to such courts or proceedings 
therein. 
(d) On appeal from or review of a ruling or 
order of an administrative board or agency. These 
rules shall apply to the practice and procedure in 
appealing from or obtaining a review of any order, 
ruling or other action of an administrative board 
or agency, except insofar as the specific 
statutory procedure in connection with any such 
appeal or review is in conflict or inconsistent 
with these rules. 
(e) Application in criminal proceedings. These 
rules of procedure shall also govern in any aspect 
of criminal proceedings where there is no other 
applicable statute or rule, provided, that any 
rule so applied does not conflict with any 
statutory or constitutional requirement, (emphasis 
added) 
Id. Subsection (e) provides that the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure apply to criminal matters at any time when they are not 
in specific conflict with any other provision or are 
unconstitutional. The Rule 41, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
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(hereinafter "Rule 41") provides, as follows: 
Rule 41. Dismissal of actions. 
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof. 
(1) By plaintiff; by stipulation. Subject to the 
provisions of Rule 23(c), of Rule 66, and of any 
applicable statute, an action may be dismissed by 
the plaintiff without order of court (i) by filing 
a notice of dismissal at any time before service 
by the adverse party of an answer or of a motion 
for summary judgment, or (ii) by filing a 
stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who 
have appeared in the action. Unless otherwise 
stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, 
the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a 
notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication 
upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has 
once dismissed in any court of the United States 
or of any state an action based on or including 
the same claim. 
(2) By order of court. Except as provided in 
Paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an 
action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's 
instance save upon order of the court and upon 
such terms and conditions as the court deems 
proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a 
defendant prior to the service upon him of the 
plaintiff's motion to dismiss, the action shall 
not be dismissed against the defendant's objection 
unless the counterclaim can remain pending for 
independent adjudication by the court. Unless 
otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal 
under this paragraph is without prejudice. 
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For 
failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply 
with these rules or any order of court, a 
defendant may move for dismissal of an action or 
of any claim against him. After the plaintiff, in 
an action tried by the court without a jury, has 
completed the presentation of his evidence the 
defendant, without waiving his right to offer 
evidence in the event the motion is not granted, 
may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon 
the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no 
right to relief. The court as trier of the facts 
may then determine them and render judgment 
against the plaintiff or may decline to render any 
judgment until the close of all the evidence. If 
the court renders judgment on the merits against 
the plaintiff, the court shall make findings as 
provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the court in its 
order for dismissal otherwise specifies/ a 
dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal 
not provided for in this rule, other than a 
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper 
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venue or for lack of an indispensable party, 
operates as an adjudication upon the merits. 
(c) Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or 
third-party claim. The provisions of this rule 
apply to the dismissal of any counterclaim, 
cross-claim, or third-party claim. A voluntary 
dismissal by the claimant alone pursuant to 
Paragraph (1) of Subdivision (a) of this rule 
shall be made before a responsive pleading is 
served or, if there is none, before the 
introduction of evidence at the trial or hearing. 
(d) Costs of previously-dismissed action. If a 
plaintiff who has once dismissed an action in any 
court commences an action based upon or including 
the same claim against the same defendant, the 
court may make such order for the payment of costs 
of the action previously dismissed as it may deem 
proper and may stay the proceedings in the action 
until the plaintiff has complied with the order. 
(e) Bond or undertaking to be delivered to adverse 
party. Should a party dismiss his complaint, 
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, 
pursuant to Subdivision (a)(l)(i) above, after a 
provisional remedy has been allowed such party, 
the bond or undertaking filed in support of such 
provisional remedy must thereupon be delivered by 
the court to the adverse party against whom such 
provisional remedy was obtained. (emphasis added) 
Id. In the current case, the dismissal of the action against Mr. 
Burningham was by the Plaintiff's ex parte Motion to Dismiss. 
(R. at 114)• Accordingly, based on the given facts of this case 
Rule 41 is not in conflict with the Rules of Criminal Procedure 
and should be the basis for the dismissal with prejudice. 
In the Order prepared by the Plaintiff there is no 
reference to the dismissal being without prejudice. (R. at 115). 
This would mean that the dismissal was with prejudice and on the 
merits. Understanding that the matter has been dismissed on the 
merits it is inappropriate that this matter be refiled. The law 
of the case is that the case has been dismissed. Mr. Burningham 
is entitled to the application of res judicata, or double 
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jeopardy or both. If the State is free to refile then at a 
minimum the threat of Judge Palmer to dismiss for failure to 
comply with discovery orders is hollow and without substance. 
Further the provisions under Rule 41 provide that the 
party refiling an action after previous dismissal should pay the 
costs of the prior case for the opposing party. This would be 
appropriate if indeed the Court permits this matter to go 
forward. In the alternative, if this Honorable Court agrees with 
Mr. Burningham then sanctions pursuant to Rule 11, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure are in order and those sanctions should be 
commensurate with the cost to Mr. Burningham of the second case. 
Certainly, Mr. Burningham should be entitled to his attorney fees 
for both cases filed—the voluntarily dismissed case and the 
refiled case and for violating Rule 11—Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure—sanctions as well. Further, the Defendant should be 
awarded attorney fees and costs on appeal. This case should be 
remanded for determination of appropriate attorney fees and 
costs. 
CONCLUSION 
Therefore, in light of the foregoing reasons, it is 
requested that this Honorable Court find no error in the trial 
courts decisions to dismiss, including the dismissal-with 
prejudice. The Appellee and Cross-Appellant further requests 
this Honorable Court to find that the dismissal-with-prejudice 
was appropriate under Rule 41 as it was not in conflict with any 
other criminal rules pursuant to Rule 81(e). 
15 
Therefore, the Appellee and Cross-Appellant further 
requests for this Court to affirm the trial court's decisions to 
dismiss and remand this matter to the trial court to determine 
attorney fees. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 12th day of 
April, 1997. 
D. BRUCE OLIVER 
Attorney for Defendant, Appellant 
and Cross-Appellant 
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ADDENDA 
I . 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by 
the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of 
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the 
county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the 
right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final 
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein 
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; 
a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against 
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the 
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause 
exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall 
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or 
in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial 
proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is 
allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
January 1, 1995 
I I . 
Rule 25. Dismissal without trial. 
(a) In its discretion, for substantial cause and in furtherance of justice, the 
court may, either on its own initiative or upon application of either party, 
order an information or indictment dismissed. 
(b) The court shall dismiss the information or indictment when: 
(1) There is unreasonable or unconstitutional delay in bringing defen-
dant to trial; 
(2) The allegations of the information or indictment, together with any 
bill of particulars furnished in support thereof, do not constitute the of-
fense intended to be charged in the pleading so filed; 
(3) It appears that there was a substantial and prejudicial defect in the 
impaneling or in the proceedings relating to the grand jury; 
(4) The court is without jurisdiction; or 
(5) The prosecution is barred by the statute of limitations. 
(c) The reasons for any such dismissal shall be set forth in an order and 
entered in the minutes. 
(d) If the dismissal is based upon the grounds that there was unreasonable 
delay, or the court is without jurisdiction, or the offense was not properly 
alleged in the information or indictment, or there was a defect in the impanel-
ing or of the proceedings relating to the grand jury, further prosecution for the 
offense shall not be barred and the court may make such orders with respect 
to the custody of the defendant pending the filing of new charges as the 
interest of justice may require. Otherwise the defendant shall be discharged 
and bail exonerated. 
An order of dismissal based upon unconstitutional delay in bringing the 
defendant to trial or based upon the statute of limitations, shall be a bar to 
any other prosecution for the offense charged. 
(e) In misdemeanor cases, upon motion of the prosecutor, the court may 
dismiss the case if it is compromised by the defendant and the injured party. 
The injured party shall first acknowledge the compromise before the court or 
in writing. The reasons for the order shall be set forth therein and entered in 
the minutes. The order shall be a bar to another prosecution for the same 
offense; provided however, that dismissal by compromise shall not be granted 
when the misdemeanor is committed by or upon a peace officer while in the 
performance of his duties, or riotously, or with an intent to commit a felony. 
Cross-References. — Detainers against Dismissal where evidence not sufficient to 
prisoners, dismissal of action for failure to establish offense charged, U.R.Cr.P. 17. 
bring to trial, § 77-29-1. Right to speedy trial, Utah ConBt., Art. I, 
Dismissal not a bar to further proceedings, Sec 12- § 77-1-6 
§ 77-1-7. 

Rule 16. Discovery. 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the de-
fense upon request the following material or information of which he has 
knowledge: 
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefen-
dants; 
(2) the criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant; 
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of 
the accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of 
the offense for reduced punishment; and 
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good 
cause shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the 
defendant to adequately prepare his defense. 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable follow-
ing the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The 
prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure. 
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose 
to the prosecutor such information as required by statute relating to alibi or 
insanity and any .other item of evidence which the court determines on good 
cause shown should be made available to the prosecutor in order for the 
prosecutor to adequately prepare his case. 
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall make all disclo-
sures at least ten days before trial or as soon as practicable. He has a continu-
ing duty to make disclosure. 
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may 
make disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and informa-
tion may be inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable times and 
places. 
(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that discov-
ery or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, or make such other order 
as is appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the court may permit the party to 
make such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to 
be inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief 
following such an ex parte showing, the entire text of the party's statement 
shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made available 
to the appellate court in the event of an appeal. 
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the 
attention of the court tha t a party has failed to comply with this rule, the 
court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a 
continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or 
it may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances. 
(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the accused may be required to: 
(1) appear in a lineup; 
(2) speak for identification; 
(3) submit to fingerprinting or the making of other bodily impressions; 
(4) pose for photographs not involving reenactment of the crime; 
(5) try on articles of clothing or other items of disguise; 
(6) permit the taking of samples of blood, hair, fingernail scrapings, 
and other bodily materials which can be obtained without unreasonable 
intrusion; 
(7) provide specimens of handwriting; 
(8) submit to reasonable physical or medical inspection of his body; and 
(9) cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appearance at the 
time of the alleged offense. 
Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is required for the forego-
ing purposes, reasonable notice of the time and place of such appearance shall 
be given to the accused and his counsel. Failure of the accused to appear or to 
comply with the requirements of this rule, unless relieved by order of the 
court, without reasonable excuse shall be grounds for revocation of pre-trial 
release, may be offered as evidence in the prosecutor's case in chief for consid-
eration along with other evidence concerning the guilt of the accused and 
shall be subject to such further sanctions as the court should deem appropri-
ate. 
IV. 
PART XL 
GENERAL PROVISIONS. 
Rule 81. Applicability of rules in general. 
(a) Special statutory proceedings. These rules shall apply to all special 
statutory proceedings, except insofar as such rules are by their nature clearly 
inapplicable. Where a statute provides for procedure by reference to any part 
of the former Code of Civil Procedure, such procedure shall be in accordance 
with these rules. 
(b) Probate and guardianship. These rules shall not apply to proceedings 
in uncontested probate and guardianship matters, but shall apply to all pro-
ceedings subsequent to the joinder of issue therein, including the enforcement 
of any judgment or order entered. 
(c) Procedure in city courts and justice courts. These rules shall apply 
to civil actions commenced in the city or justice courts, except insofar as such 
rules are by their nature clearly inapplicable to such courts or proceedings 
therein. 
(d) On appeal from or review of a ruling or order of an administra-
tive board or agency. These rules shall apply to the practice and procedure 
in appealing from or obtaining a review of any order, ruling or other action of 
an administrative board or agency, except insofar as the specific statutory 
procedure in connection with any such appeal or review is in conflict or incon-
sistent with these rules. 
(e) Application in criminal proceedings. These rules of procedure shall 
also govern in any aspect of criminal proceedings where there is no other 
applicable statute or rule, provided, that any rule so applied does not conflict 
with any statutory or constitutional requirement. 
Rule 41. Dismissal of actions. 
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof. 
(1) By plaintiff; by stipulation. Subject to the provisions of Rule 
23(c), of Rule 66, and of any applicable statute, an action may be dis-
missed by the plaintiff without order of court (i) by filing a notice of 
dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or 
of a motion for summary judgment, or (ii) by filing a stipulation of dismis-
sal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action. Unless other-
wise stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is with-
out prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication 
upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any 
court of the United States or of any state an action based on or including 
the same claim. 
(2) By order of court . Except as provided in Paragraph (1) of this 
subdivision of this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs 
instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions 
as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defen-
dant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the 
action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the 
counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the 
court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this 
paragraph is without prejudice. 
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For failure of the plaintiff to 
prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may 
move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him. After the plaintiff, 
in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation 
of his evidence the defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in 
the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground 
that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The 
court as trier of the facts may then determine them and render judgment 
against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of 
all the evidence. If the court renders judgment on the merits against the 
plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the 
court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this 
subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a 
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an indis-
pensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the merits. 
(c) Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. The 
provisions of this rule apply to the dismissal of any counterclaim, cross-claim, 
or third-party claim. A voluntary dismissal by the claimant alone pursuant to 
Paragraph (1) of Subdivision (a) of this rule shall be made before a responsive 
pleading is served or, if there is none, before the introduction of evidence at 
the trial or hearing. 
(d) Costs of previously-dismissed action. If a plaintiff who has once 
dismissed an action in any court commences an action based upon or including 
the same claim against the same defendant, the court may make such order 
for the payment of costs of the action previously dismissed as it may deem 
proper and may stay the proceedings in the action until the plaintiff has 
complied with the order. 
(e) Bond or under tak ing to be delivered to adverse party. Should a 
party dismiss his complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, 
pursuant to Subdivision (a)(l)(i) above, after a provisional remedy has been 
allowed such party, the bond or undertaking filed in support of such provi-
sional remedy must thereupon be delivered by the court to the adverse party 
against whom such provisional remedy was obtained. 
Compiler's Notes. — Subdivisions (a) to (d) 
of this rule are substantially similar to Rule 
41, F.R.C.P. 
VI. 
Rule 11. Signing of pleadings, motions, and other papers; 
sanctions. 
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an attor-
ney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his individual name 
who is duly licensed to practice in the state of Utah. The attorney's address 
also shall be stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign 
his pleading, motion, or other paper and state his address. Except when other-
wise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or 
accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer 
under oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one 
witness sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature 
of an attorney or party constitutes a certification by him that he has read the 
pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, informa-
tion, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and 
is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any 
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless 
increase in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not 
signed, it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is 
called to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other 
paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own 
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or 
both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other 
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of 
the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985.) 
